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In an iterated non-cooperative game, if all the players act to maximize their individual
accumulated payoff, the system as a whole usually converges to a Nash equilibrium that poorly
benefits any player. Here we show that such an undesirable destiny is avoidable in an iterated
Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game involving two players X and Y. Player X has the option of
proactively adopting a cooperation-trap strategy, which enforces complete cooperation from the
rational player Y and leads to a highly beneficial as well as maximally fair situation to both
players. That maximal degree of cooperation is achievable in such a competitive system with cyclic
dominance of actions may stimulate creative thinking on how to resolve conflicts and enhance
cooperation in human societies.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The solution concept of Nash equilibrium (NE) plays a
fundamental role both in classic game theory and in evo-
lutionary game theory [1–4]. This concept is developed
under the assumption that the players of a game system
are sufficiently rational, so that they are able to learn
accurately the strategies of the competing players and to
optimize their own strategy accordingly. A Nash equilib-
rium is then a point in the strategy space of the game
system such that any single player is unable to achieve
better performance by changing her/his own strategy in
any arbitrary way.
Many non-cooperative games have only a unique NE.
When such a game is played by highly rational players
who act to maximize their individual accumulated pay-
off, it is unavoidable that the system will sooner or later
converge to this unique equilibrium situation. Unfortu-
nately, however, it is usually the case that the NE of a
non-cooperative game is an unfavorable or even miserable
destiny for all the players. Let’s consider the two-player
Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) game as a simple example. The
cooperative situation of both players choosing not to con-
fess is much better than the defection situation of both
players choosing to confess, but the latter is the unique
NE of this game while the former is not [5]. The Nash
equilibrium theory therefore predicts that cooperation is
unlikely to sustain when rational players face the conflict
between self-interest and group benefit. Yet cooperation
is actually a ubiquitous phenomenon of human society at
all levels, and it is also widely observed in various bio-
logical systems. Researchers have been puzzled by these
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facts very much for many years, and they have proposed
a long list of microscopic mechanisms trying to explain
the promotion and maintenance of cooperation [6–8].
In this paper we study cooperation in the itererated
two-player Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game, which is
a fundamental non-cooperative game with cyclic dom-
inance among its action choices (namely Rock beats
Scissors, Scissors beats Paper, and Paper in turn beats
Rock), see Fig. 1. While the NE theoretical frame-
work assumes that the rational players of such a game
behave passively in the sense that they try to maxi-
mize individual gains by making best responses to the
inferred/experienced strategy of the opponent, we as-
sume that one of the players might act more proactively.
An intelligent and rational player may ask the follow-
ing question: how should I design my own strategy so
that my rational opponent(s), in best response to me, for
sure will adopt certain strategy that is most beneficial
to me? In later discussions we refer to such a strategy
as a cooperation-trap (CT) strategy, as it has the effect
of trapping an opponent in a cooperation state. When
optimized, such a CT strategy offers high and maximally
fair accumulated payoffs to both players.
In a literature search for related studies, we found that
an early paper of Grofman and Pool [9] investigated co-
operation in the PD game from the same angle of intel-
ligent design. In this pioneer but largely forgotten pa-
per, the authors proved that a partial Tit-for-Tat strat-
egy [10] has the potential of enforcing cooperation in the
two-player iterated PD game. The Win-stay, Lose-shift
strategy [11, 12] can also be analyzed in a similar way.
The present effort can be regarded as an extension
of the Grofman-Pool theory to the iterated RPS game,
which has the additional difficulty of having more than
two action choices that are related by a rotation symme-
try (see Fig. 1B). This same theoretical framework may
also be applicable to many other two-player iterated non-
cooperative games, and it may serve as a guiding prin-
ciple of designing fair solutions or strategies for the pur-
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FIG. 1: The RPS game. (A) The payoff matrix. Each
matrix element is the payoff of the row player X’s action in
competition with the column player Y’s action. (B) The cyclic
(non-transitive) dominance relationship among the three can-
didate actions: Rock (R) beats Scissors (S), S beats Paper
(P ), and P in turn beats R.
pose of resolving conflicts and enhancing cooperation in
human societies.
II. THE ROCK-PAPER-SCISSORS GAME
Consider two players X and Y playing the RPS game
for an indefinite number of rounds. At every game round
each player can choose one action among three candidate
actions R (rock), P (paper) and S (scissors). This game
has only a single parameter, the payoff a (> 1) of the
winning action (see Fig. 1A). For example, if the player
X chooses action R in one game round and her opponent
Y chooses action S, then X wins with payoff a and Y
loses and gets zero payoff; if the competition is a tie with
both players choosing the same action, each player gets
unit payoff.
When a > 1 the system has only a unique NE and it is
mixed-strategy in nature, namely each player chooses the
three actions with equal probability 1/3 at every game
round independently of each other and of the prior ac-
tion choices [2]. In this mixed-strategy NE the expected
payoff per round (EPR) for each player is then simply
g0 ≡ (1 + a)/3. We refer to g0 as the NE payoff. For
1 < a < 2 the NE payoff is less than the unit payoff
value each player would get if both players choose the
same action in every game round, and consequently the
NE is evolutionarily unstable in this parameter range.
When a > 2 the NE mixed strategy outperforms the pure
strategy of both players choosing the same action, and
the NE is then evolutionarily stable [3, 4, 13] and is the
converging point of various dynamical learning processes
[14].
A. Memoryless cooperation-trap strategies
We now develop CT strategies for player X, and begin
with the simplest case of memoryless strategies, namely
at every game round player X does not consider her and
her opponent’s prior actions nor the outcomes of prior
plays but chooses actions R, P and S according to the
corresponding probabilities pr, pp, and ps (≡ 1−pr−pp),
which are fixed by player X at the beginning of the whole
game. Without loss of generality we assume that pr ≥ pp
and pr ≥ ps, i.e., action R is a favoriate choice of X.
As player Y is sufficiently intelligent, he will figure
out the strategy of X after a small number of game re-
peats. (Alternatively, player X may also explicitly inform
Y about her two choice parameters pr and pp.) And since
Y is sufficiently rational, he then for sure will adopt the
optimized probabilities q∗r , q
∗
p, and q
∗
s (≡ 1− q∗r − q∗p) of
choosing the three actions R, P and S. The EPR gx of
player X and the optimized EPR g∗y of player Y are
gx = prq
∗
r + ppq
∗
p + psq
∗
s + a(prq
∗
s + ppq
∗
r + psq
∗
p) , (1)
g∗y = q
∗
rpr + q
∗
ppp + q
∗
sps + a(q
∗
rps + q
∗
ppr + q
∗
spp) . (2)
If the strategy of player X have the following prop-
erty that pr ≥ ps > pp, then because action P is
strictly the least favored choice of player X, then player
Y realizes that it is of his best interest to choose ac-
tion R in every game round (q∗r = 1, q
∗
p = q
∗
s = 0) if
pr − pp > a(pr − ps) but to choose action P in every
game round (q∗p = 1, q
∗
s = q
∗
r = 0) if pr − pp < a(pr − ps).
In other words, player X traps player Y to stay in a
pure strategy which has maximal degree of predictability.
Player X of course should choose the strategy parameters
pr and pp to maximize her EPR gx under the constraint
of not destroying the nice trapping effect of her strategy.
It is not difficult to verify the following conclusions: (1)
If the payoff parameter a ∈ [1, (1 +√3)/2), the optimal
CT strategy is
p∗r =
a
2a− 1 −  , p
∗
p = 0 , p
∗
s =
a− 1
2a− 1 +  . (3)
(Here and in latter discussions,  → 0+ is an arbitrar-
ily small positive value.) The associated maximal EPR
for player X is g∗x = a/(2a − 1), while player Y is very
satisfied with sticking to action R and getting a larger
EPR of g∗y = a
2/(2a − 1). To give a concrete example,
at a = 1.1 we have g∗x ≈ 0.917 and g∗y ≈ 1.008, which are
considerably larger than the NE payoff g0 = 0.7. (2) If
a ∈ (2 +√3,+∞), the optimal CT strategy is
p∗r =
a
2a− 1 +  , p
∗
p = 0 , p
∗
s =
a− 1
2a− 1 −  , (4)
The associated optimal EPR of player X is g∗x = a(a −
1)/(2a − 1), while player Y receives a larger EPR value
of g∗y = a
2/(2a − 1) by sticking to action P . Notice
that when a is sufficiently large, g∗x ≈ a/2 − 1/4 and
g∗y ≈ a/2 + 1/4, which are almost 1.5 times that of the
NE payoff g0.
Figure 2 gives a direct view about how the optimal
EPRs of both players and the optimal CT strategy of
player X change with a. This optimal memoryless CT
strategy indeed offers both players higher accumulated
payoffs than the NE mixed strategy does. However, the
passive player Y benefits more than the proactive player
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FIG. 2: Optimal memoryless CT strategy. The opti-
mal values of both players’ EPR gx and gy are shown in the
upper panel (in units of NE payoff g0) for each fixed value of
a, while the optimal values of the CT strategy’s choice prob-
abilities pr, pp and ps are shown in the lower panel. When
a ∈ [1.366, 3.732] the NE mixed strategy is better for player
X than the CT strategy.
X. It is then natural for player X to feel that she has
sacrificed too much for enforcing cooperation and to de-
clare that such a CT strategy, although better than the
NE mixed strategy, is unfair as her opponent earns more
by free riding. Furthermore, this CT strategy is worse
than the NE mixed strategy in the parameter range of
a ∈ [1.366, 3.732].
These shortcomings of the memoryless CT strategy can
be eliminated by increasing the memory length of the CT
strategy.
B. Cooperation-trap strategies with finite memory
length
Recent laboratory experiments of Wang and Xu [15] re-
vealed that decision-making of human subjects has strong
memory effect, namely the payoffs of the previous game
rounds influence considerably a player’s action choices in
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FIG. 3: Optimal CT strategy of unit memory length.
The optimal values of both players’ EPR gx and gy are shown
in the upper panel (in units of NE payoff g0) for each fixed
value of a, while the optimal values of the CT strategy’s choice
probabilities pr, pp and ps are shown in the lower panel. When
a ∈ [1.649, 2.905] the NE mixed strategy is better for player
X than the CT strategy.
the following game rounds. For the RPS game, the impli-
cations of such conditional response strategies have not
yet been fully explored. Here we suggest that the proac-
tive player X can adopt an optimized version of such a
strategy to enforce fair cooperation.
When the payoff parameter a > 2, a play output of
win-lose brings payoff a to the group, while a tie output
only brings lower payoff 2. Therefore it is desirable for
player X to discourage the occurrence of tie output. For
the simplest case of unit memory length, the CT strat-
egy then goes as follows: If player X wins over or loses
to player Y in the previous game round, then in the next
round she chooses action R with probability pr ≥ 1/2 and
action S with probability ps = 1 − pr (she avoid choos-
ing action P , i.e., pp = 0); but if X ties with Y in the
previous game round, then in the next round she chooses
the three candidate actions with equal probability 1/3.
This strategy has only a single parameter pr. The moti-
vation for player X to adopt the NE mixed strategy after
4experiencing a tie output is to discourage player Y from
choosing action R: although Y might get a higher ex-
pected payoff in one game round by choosing action R
rather than action P , the former choice has a high prob-
ability of leading to a tie, which will then reduce player
Y’s expected payoff to g0 in the following one or even
more game rounds.
On the other hand, when 1 < a < 2, a play output of
tie is better off to the group than a win-lose output. Then
player X has the option of implementing a CT strategy to
discourage player Y from either winning over or losing to
her. Again for the simplest case of unit memory length,
the recipe of the CT strategy is: If player X ties with
player Y in the previous game round, then in the next
round she chooses action R with probability pr ≥ 1/2
and action S with probability ps = 1−pr; but if X either
wins over or loses to Y in the previous round, then in the
next round she chooses the three candidate actions with
equal probability 1/3.
It turns out that the optimal CT strategy of unit
memory length has the following quantitative proper-
ties: (1) If a ∈ [1, 3/2], then the optimal value p∗r for
the choice probability pr is p
∗
r = 1 − , and the opti-
mal EPRs of player X and player Y are equal, g∗x =
g∗y = 1. (2) If a ∈ (3/2, 1.649), then p∗r = 8a/[9a −
3 +
√
(9a− 3)2 − 48a2]− , and the optimal EPRs for X
and Y are, respectively, g∗x = [1+a(1−p∗r)]/(4−3p∗r) and
g∗y = [1 + 2a(1−p∗r)]/(4−3p∗r). (3) If a ∈ (2.905, 6), then
p∗r = 4a/[3(a− 1) +
√
9(a− 1)2 + 24a2] + , and the op-
timal EPRs for X and Y are, respectively, g∗x = (1− p∗r)a
and g∗y = p
∗
ra. (4) If a ∈ [6,+∞), then p∗r = 1/2 + , and
the optimal EPRs for X and Y are eqaul, g∗x = g
∗
y = a/2.
Figure 3 gives a direct view of these properties. Com-
pared with the optimal memoryless CT strategy of Fig. 2,
we notice a major qualitative improvement is that this
new optimal CT strategy achieves fair outcomes to player
X and player Y when 1 ≤ a ≤ 3/2 or a ≥ 6. However,
this optimal CT strategy of unit memory length is still
not perfect, as it is not applicable for a ∈ [1.649, 2.905],
and it is not completely fair to the proactive player X for
a ∈ (3/2, 1.649) ∪ (2.905, 6).
To completely eliminate these undesirable features,
player X can increase the memory length of her CT
strategy and therefore be more non-tolerant to defec-
tion. There are many ways of implementing such an idea.
When a > 2, arguably the simplest CT strategy of mem-
ory length m goes as follows: By default player X adopts
the mixed strategy (pr, 0, 1 − pr) in every game round,
namely she chooses action R with probability pr ≥ 1/2
and action S with the remaining probability ps = 1− pr;
however if a tie occurs in one game round, then player
X shifts to the NE mixed strategy (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) in the
next m game rounds and then shifts back to the default
strategy (pr, 0, 1− pr) in the (m+ 1)-th game round. It
is a simple exercise to check that, if
pr ≥ max
(1
2
,
2a√
4ma2 +A2 − |A|
)
, (5)
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FIG. 4: Optimal CT strategy of finite memory length.
The optimal values of both players’ EPR gx and gy are shown
in the upper panel (in units of NE payoff g0) for each fixed
value of a, while the minimal memory length m∗ of the CT
strategy is shown in the lower panel.
where A ≡ 1+(1+a)m/3−2a, then player Y will be sat-
isfied with sticking to action P in every game round. If
player X sets the memory length to the smallest positive
integer m∗ which reduces Eq. (5) to the trivial require-
ment of pr ≥ 1/2, then it is optimal for player X to set pr
to the value p∗r = 1/2, and the optimal EPRs for player
X and player Y are equal, g∗x = g
∗
y = a/2. Notice that for
a approaches 2 from above with a = 2 + , the required
minimal memory length diverges as m∗ ≈ 6/. In other
words, it is most difficult to enforce fair cooperation when
a ≈ 2, see Fig. 4.
If the payoff parameter a < 2, an optimal CT strategy
with memory length m can be constructed following the
same line of reasoning as above, namely that player X
adopts action R at every game round, but if she loses
to player Y in one game round, then she shifts to the
NE mixed strategy in the next m game rounds and then
shifts back to the default strategy (1, 0, 0) in the (m+1)-
th game round. We can easily verify that if player X sets
the memory length to be m > 3(a− 1)/(2− a), then it is
optimal for player Y to stick to action R in every game
5round, and the optimal EPRs for both players are equal,
g∗x = g
∗
y = 1.
As clearly demonstrated in Fig. 4, for each payoff pa-
rameter a 6= 2, an optimal CT strategy with a finite
memory length m∗ can be implemented to achieve max-
imal and fair accumulated payoff for both players. At
a = 2, there is no need to adopt a CT strategy, as the
NE mixed strategy is itself optimal.
III. DISCUSSION
We have demonstrated in this paper that fair coop-
eration can be achieved in the two-player iterated RPS
game. Such a highly cooperative state brings maximal
accumulated payoff to the group, and it is not enforced
by external authorities but by the proactive decision of
one player to adopt an optimal cooperation-trap strategy.
The basic designing principle of such optimal CT strate-
gies should be generally applicable to other two-player
iterated non-cooperation games.
For the optimal CT strategies to work, the passive
player Y is assumed to be considerably rational so that he
adopts a best response strategy to that of his opponent
X to maximize his accumulated payoff, while the proac-
tive player X is assumed in addition to be wise enough
so that she does not exploit the cooperation state of her
opponent too much but is satisfied with a fair share of
the total accumulated group payoff. This latter assump-
tion might be a little bit too strong, but maybe it is not
strictly necessary as player Y will punish X for defection
behaviors.
For the iterated RPS game, it appears to be impossi-
ble for the proactive player X to design a CT strategy
which brings higher expected payoff per game round to
herself than to her opponent. However, this is not a gen-
eral conclusion. For some other game systems, notably
the iterated PD game [9, 16]), the proactive player X
has the option of optimizing her CT strategy to extort
her opponent Y. We do not recommend the adoption of
such greedy strategies, as the opponent player Y will very
likely be frustrated by the defection behaviors of player
X and he may then choose not to cooperate even such a
choice hurts also himself [17].
When strategic interactions occur in biological sys-
tems, the involved individual animals, insects, bacte-
ria, cells, ..., are of course far from being rational or
sufficiently intelligent. However the collective decision-
making of such agents at the population level, aided by
the evolutionary mechanism of mutation and selection,
may appear to be very rational. By trial and error,
such systems may develop certain CT-like strategies even
without the need of intelligent designing. It would be
very interesting to investigate empirically whether CT
strategies are actually implemented in some biological
systems.
Cooperation in a finite-population RPS game system
with more than two players may be much more difficult to
achieve than the case of two players. A recent theoretical
investigation by one of the present authors [15] suggested
that optimized conditional response strategies might of-
fer higher accumulated payoffs to individual players than
the NE mixed strategy does. But it is still an open ques-
tion as to whether high degree of coopeation can also
be enforced in a multiple-player iterated RPS game by a
number of proactive players. We leave such a challenging
issue to future investigations.
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